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Engineering Science Contract Group (ESCG), Houston, TX, 77598 
The Crew Exploration Vehicle Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) is engaged in a 
multi-year design and test campaign aimed at qualifying a parachute recovery system for 
human use on the Orion Spacecraft. Orion has parachute flight performance requirements 
that will ultimately be verified through the use of Monte Carlo multi-degree of freedom 
flight simulations. These simulations will be anchored by real world flight test data and 
iteratively improved to provide a closer approximation to the real physics observed in the 
inherently chaotic inflation and steady state flight of the CPAS parachutes. This paper will 
examine the processes necessary to verify the flight performance requirements of the human 
rated spacecraft. The focus will be on the requirements verification and model validation 
planned on CPAS. 
Nomenclature 
CEV = Crew Exploration Vehicle 
CM = Crew Module 
CPAS = Crew Exploration Vehicle Parachute Assembly System 
DOE = Design of Experiments 
DOF = Degrees of Freedom 
DSS = Decelerator Systems Simulation 
ESCG = Engineering and Science Contract Group 
Gen = Generation 
GNC = Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
IPT = Integrated Product Team 
M&S = Modeling & Simulation 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
OFT-1 = Orion Flight Test 1 
PTRS = Project Technical Requirements Specification 
RCS = Reaction Control System 
SE&I = Systems Engineering and Integration 
STD = Documentation Standard 
V&V = Verification and Validation 
I. Introduction 
HE Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) project flight performance 
requirements will be verified via analysis. Therefore, the simulations used to perform the analyses must 
accurately depict a physical environment similar to what the CEV will experience during flight. This is achieved by 
acquiring high fidelity data from multiple flight tests and refining model parameters based on the physics observed. 
After each flight, the simulation and modeling tools are incrementally refined to model phenomena observed in 
flight tests. However, not every aspect of the physical environment is being modeled because current models are 
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Table 1. Terminal rate of descent requirements from the CPAS PTRS Rev B. 
Requirement 
Title & Number 
Requirement Text Rationale 
CM Standard Day 
Maximum 
Terminal Rate of 
Descent 
CPAS shall limit the terminal vertical 
descent rate of the CM to less than 
33.0 ft/s (10.07 m/s) at standard sea-
level conditions (as defined in NASA-
TM-X-74335, U.S. Standard 
Atmosphere, 1976) for a maximum 
CM mass of 20,865.0 lbm 
(9,464.2 kg). 
This requirement applies in calm air (no wind). The 
system-level landing analysis, performed by Lockheed 
Martin, will account for atmospheric dynamics including 
vertical and horizontal winds, elevation, temperature 
effects, etc., and should be verified for all fault conditions 
defined in. The mass specified above is the total mass of 





Terminal Rate of 
Descent 
CPAS main parachutes shall reach the 
CM Standard Day Maximum Terminal 
Rate of Descent at no lower than 200 ft 
(61.0 m) MSL when measured from 
the CM center of gravity under 
standard atmospheric conditions (as 
defined in NASA-TM-X-74335, U.S. 
Standard Atmosphere, 1976). 
This requirement assumes calm air (no wind). While the 
CM nominally lands at zero feet MSL, this additional 
altitude is included to account for atmospheric variations 
(i.e. the “nonstandard day”). This requirement must be met 
in the presence of failures for nominal landings and aborts. 
 
based on simplified heritage models. In addition, current state of the art modeling capabilities are limited and cannot 
completely simulate the chaotic aerodynamic flow and parachute interaction events. Statistical techniques, including 
Design of Experiments (DOE)1,2 and Monte Carlo3 analyses will be implemented to understand the sensitivities of 
parachute performance parameters and to ensure the physical characteristics not modeled are taken into 
consideration via error distributions.  
The analytical approach for verifying performance parameters is unique when applied to a human rated 
parachute system. Many aspects of the system, such as the deployment sequence, cannot be modeled reliably and 
requires numerous test demonstrations to improve understanding and anchor current deployment models. It is 
impractical to conduct flight tests throughout the operational envelope; therefore, the flight performance 
requirements must be verified using the aforementioned simulations. The flight performance measurements, such as 
rate of descent and inflation loads imparted to the structure, can be modeled consistently using 6-Degree-of-
Freedom (6-DOF) flight simulations such as DSSA and DSS. It is of utmost importance that the stakeholders 
responsible for verifying flight performance requirements have confidence in the simulation results to make an 
informed decision regarding the satisfactory verification of requirements. DOE studies and NASA standards for 
model development and use, such as NASA Technical Standard “Standard for Models and Simulations” (NASA-
STD-7009)4, help to increase credibility of the simulations and therefore instill confidence in their results.  
II. Description of Requirements 
CPAS intends to analytically verify three categories of requirements. These requirement categories include 
terminal rate of descent, parachute loads, and torque required to reorient the vehicle prior to touchdown. These 
categories are represented by total of seven requirements. 
The requirements that must be verified are documented in the Project Technical Requirements Specification 
(PTRS) for CPAS (JSC-63497 Rev B)5 and are summarized in the subsequent sections.  
A. Terminal Rate of Descent Requirements 
The terminal Rate of Descent (ROD) is the velocity of Orion upon touchdown. Table 1 lists the two requirements 
that pertain to ROD. The first requires the touchdown velocity be less than 33.0 ft/s with a maximum Orion weight 
of 20,865 lbm. The second requires Orion to reach the 33.0 ft/s velocity at an altitude greater than 200 ft above mean 
sea level. As stated in the Rationale, the terminal ROD only applies in conditions with no wind. Also, these 
requirements must be applied to all potential failure scenarios. 
  




Table 2. Parachute inflation and disreef load requirements from the CPAS PTRS Rev B. 
Requirement 
Title & Number 




CPAS shall limit the total peak drogue parachute 
cluster load to less than 67,300 lbf (299,400 N) under 
all failure conditions specified herein, including any 
one skipped drogue reefing stage, with the 
probabilities specified in Table 3.3-1, Simulated 
Parachute Load Distributions. 
See Table 4.   
Peak Main Loads 
 
CPAS shall limit the total peak main parachute cluster 
load to less than 89,700 lbf (399,000 N) under all 
failure conditions specified herein, including any one 
skipped main reefing stage, with the probabilities 
specified in Table 3.3-1, Simulated Parachute Load 
Distributions. 





CPAS shall limit the peak load on a single drogue 
riser to less than 50,500 lbf (224,600 N) under all 
failure conditions specified herein, including any one 
skipped reefing stage, with the probabilities specified 
in Table 3.3-1, Simulated Parachute Load 
Distributions. 
The single riser load drives part of the design 
of the CM attach points. CPAS must limit the 
loads on these attach points in order to 
prevent catastrophic failure of the attach 
points. The peak single drogue riser load is 
75% of the peak drogue cluster load specified 
in See Table 4. 
Peak Single Main 
Riser Loads 
 
CPAS shall limit the peak load on a single main riser 
to less than 67,300 lbf (299,400 N) under all failure 
conditions specified herein, including any one skipped 
reefing stage, with the probabilities specified in Table 
3.3-1, Simulated Parachute Load Distributions. 
The single riser load drives part of the design 
of the CM attach points. CPAS must limit the 
loads on these attach points in order to 
prevent catastrophic failure of the attach 
points. The peak single main riser load is 75% 
of the peak main cluster load, as specified in 
Table 4. 
 
Figure 1. Example peak loads occurring at inflation and disreef stages 
during a nominal descent. 
B. Parachute Load 
Requirements 
Quantifying parachute 
loads is critical to ensure 
human survival on Orion. 
Loads which act on the 
parachute canopy and risers 
must be bounded for the 
nominal flight conditions as 
well as all potential failure 
modes. An example loads 
trace of a nominal extraction 
(first peak), two Drogues, 
three Mains parachute system 
under nominal descent is 
shown in Figure 1. This figure 
shows that under a nominal 
descent, the highest loads 
occur at the inflation and 
disreefing stages. However, 
the highest loads could occur 
at a different stage during 
failure.  
  




Table 3. Torque requirement from the CPAS PTRS Rev B. 
Requirement 
Title & Number 




CPAS shall limit the torque 
required to rotate the CM 
about the gravity vector 
during the terminal descent 
phase to less than 450 ft∙lbf 
(610 N∙m) when the total 
twist angle between the 
vehicle and canopies is less 
than 1,800 <TBR-497-007> 
degrees. 
The CM is designed to land in a feet-forward 
orientation. The CM Reaction Control System 
(RCS) must be able to overcome the parachute 
harness/riser torque. The thrust and mass of 
propellant to use for landing orientation is 
limited. The Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
(GNC) system is responsible for not only 
nulling any rotation rate built up in the system, 
but also “untwisting” the risers into the range 
of zero to five <TBR-497-007> total twists (0-
1,800 <TBR-497-007> degrees). 




Figure 2. Ground 
test of twisted 
parachute riser 
lines. 
The applicable requirements are broken into peak cluster and individual riser loads on the Drogue and Main 
parachutes. The load requirements for the Drogue phase, state that during each reefed stage, the cluster of two 
parachutes must not exceed a load higher than 67,300 lbf and a single riser must not exceed 50,500 lbf. The 
requirement for the Main phase restrict riser and cluster peak loads from exceeding 67,300 lbf and 89,700 lbf, 
respectively. The load requirements in Table 2 include all failure scenarios. (Each loads requirement calls out Table 
3.3-1 in the CPAS PTRS; this table can be seen below as Table 4 in this document.) 
C. Torque Requirement 
Due to environmental conditions including wind gusts, the random aerodynamic flow, and parachute cluster 
interactions, Orion and CPAS may rotate and cause a torque which needs to be modeled time-accurately. Table 3 
presents the formal 
wording and 
Rationale of the 
requirement as seen 
in the CPAS PTRS 
Rev. B. The torque 
requirement flows 
down from parent 
requirements stating that the crew must land in a particular orientation. This requires 





performance by establishing the 
performance of CPAS.  
Ground tests such as the torque 
test depicted in Figure 2  help bound 
the amount of torque expected 
during flight. Risers in the 
configuration shown can create 
torque on the Orion vehicle or 
parachute system.  If the torque seen 
during ground testing is within the 
GNC subsystem’s ability to control, 
no extra hardware is necessary on 
CPAS. 
D. Requirement Probability for 
Verification 
Since not every aspect of the 
physical environment can be 
modeled due to random 
aerodynamic flow characteristics 
and parachute interactions, the 
requirements must be verified 
through the use of Monte Carlo 
simulations and statistical 
interpretations of the resulting data. 
  





Figure 3. Process of Assessing Sensitivity of Parachute 
Model Parameters 
This necessitates that the requirements include a probabilistic measure for verification purposes. Table 4 presents the 
necessary probabilities to verify the load requirements with a 50% confidence. The ROD and Torque requirements 
must be met with a 99.87% probability and a 90% confidence, which will be included in the next revision of the 
Validation & Verification Document6. 
III. Description of Modeling Tools 
The Decelerator Systems Simulation (DSS)7,8 is the primary tool that will be used to verify requirements through 
analysis. It is a legacy 6 Degree-of-Freedom (DOF) parachute trajectory simulation based on the UD233A 
simulation used by the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster parachute project. DSS is the highest fidelity NASA-
maintained simulation used by the CPAS project. This simulation tool provides high fidelity results for predicting 
inflation loads, disreef loads, and terminal rate of descent; and has been proven by flight test reconstructions 
performed on X-38, Orion Pad Abort Demonstrator, and recent CPAS flight tests.  
In addition to flight data reconstructions performed using DSS, the CPAS project also uses off the shelf software 
to assess the statistical implications of measured rate of descent9 and torque models. At the time of this paper, a 
simpler, stand-alone inflation model is also being considered. A simple tool has the advantage of greatly reducing 
the amount of time necessary to implement test cases. A standard Monte Carlo involves hundreds or thousands of 
case runs with an integrated vehicle configuration. With the current tool, this consumes a large amount of time and 
computing power. Without decreasing the fidelity of results, a simple simulation tool would significantly reduce run 
time by avoiding the use of a fully integrated vehicle trajectory. 
IV. Process to Determine Sensitivity of Parameters 
The CPAS project is using DOE to determine which parachute model parameters are most sensitive to affecting 
loads and rate of descent outputs.10 Conducting a DOE study also identifies important parameter interactions. These 
techniques are applied to inflation and disreef loading models and for Main parachute full open rate of descent 
models. Once the most sensitive model parameters are determined, focused testing and measurements during flight 
tests will improve the determination of those sensitive factors and their dispersions. The details of how these factors 
are applied on CPAS are discussed in the CPAS performance modeling paper11. 
The process of this sensitivity study involves 1) developing benchmark cases that are representative of typical 
CPAS flight tests, 2) generating additional benchmark cases that are representative of typical Orion entry and abort 
trajectories, 3) choosing the “factors” or parachute parameters to vary, 4) creating and simulating a specific number 
of cases based on the factors and levels selected (a more comprehensive description of factors and levels may be 
found in an introductory DOE text1,2) and 5) interpreting the resulting statistical output. This process is illustrated in 
Figure 3. Once the parameter significance and interactions have been determined, the effects of the parameter 
dispersions will be investigated. 
 Preliminary DOE studies indicate that 
several of the parachute parameters that 
are currently modeled separately are 
actually interrelated. This finding may lead 
to a reexamination of how these 
parameters are modeled, which will likely 
help improve and validate the simulations 
to make them more representative of real-
world conditions. In turn, the improved 
simulations could be used to verify 
requirements by analysis with a higher 
degree of certainty. 
V. Model Credibility Score 
In order to determine whether or not a requirement is verified via analysis, it is imperative for decision makers to 
understand the credibility of the model used for analysis. NASA-STD-70094, which was developed following the 
Columbia Space Shuttle accident, aids in communicating to decision makers the fidelity and credibility of an 
analysis. It dictates standards to which simulation developers and users must adhere to in order to ensure the 
simulation tools are credible for making decisions related to human-rated spacecraft. These standards define a level 
of documentation during simulation development, training and education of the simulation users, and an 
understanding of the criticality of decisions that are to be made with the simulation. There are three categories: 
  





Figure 4. Model Credibility Scoring Guidelines (from NASA Standard 7009). 
Modeling & Simulation (M&S) Development, M&S Operations, and Supporting Evidence, each of which has a few 
factors as shown in Figure 4. Each of these factors is assessed and a model and simulation credibility score may be 
assigned so that stakeholders understand the level of credibility of the model when making decisions.  
Using the guidelines outlined in Figure 4. Model Credibility Scoring Guidelines (from NASA Standard 7009)., 
the CPAS project performed an assessment of the credibility of DSS. Ultimately, DSS scored a 3.125/4.0 on the 
Model Credibility Assessment. This score is above average because though parachute dynamics are difficult to 
predict, the sensitivity of many parachute parameters are known, the DSS algorithm is able to process the same 
inputs in multiple ways which creates a nondeterministic analysis, and the DSS results as well as inputs agree with 
flight test data. All these factors and a handful of others provide a high score on NASA’s Model and Credibility 
Scoring Guidelines. Figure 5 summarize the scores for each factor. The rationale for each individual score is given 
below. 
 
A. Verification – Received a score of 3.0/4.0. Due to flight test data, and as a result of the DOE study, formal 
numerical error estimation is possible. The results of the simulations will be assessed to provide 90% 
tolerance limits on the performance values, as required by the PTRS. 
 
B. Validation – Received a score of 3.0/4.0. Results agree with real world data for problems of interest. The 
project is focused on reconstructing observed flight test observations using the models. The use of the 
models to predict performance prior to the test, and to reconstruct the test results using observed 
environmental factors will provide validation of the models. 
 
C. Input Pedigree – Received a score of 3.0/4.0. Input data agrees with real world for problems of interest. 
Flight test data is being collected using calibrated, redundant data collection systems. This provides both 
information regarding level and variability that will be used in the model. For simulation purposes, the input 
data will be dispersed based on the flight test data collected. 
 
  





Figure 5. CPAS Model Credibility Assessment Score per 
Category (Current as of January 2011). 






















D. Results Uncertainty – Received a score of 3.0/4.0. Uncertainty results will be quantified with numerical 
analysis. Appropriate statistical analyses of the results will be provided to quantitatively define the results in 
a probabilistic manner. The requirements indicate that performance values must be expressed in terms of 
tolerance intervals (the probability 
that the population does not 
exceed a specified probability 
with a defined confidence). This 
factor may be upgraded to 4.0/4.0 
after the completion of this effort.  
 
E. Results Robustness – Received a 
score of 3.0/4.0. The DOE study 
to determine the parameter 
significance will identify the 
statistically significant parameters 
and further evaluation of the 
parameter dispersions will 
provide a quantitative 
understanding of the sensitivity of 
the model to the parameters. The 
actual values of the parameters, 
and their dispersions, will be 
measured by ground and flight 
tests. This factor may be upgraded 
to 4.0/4.0 after the completion of 
this effort.  
 
F. Use History – Received a score of 3.0/4.0. The DSS tool has been used to make preflight predictions for 
parachute tests on a variety of programs including X-38, PAD, and CPAS. Results have compared favorably 
with mission data. 
 
G. M&S Management – Received a score of 3.0/4.0. Model improvements are tracked and under configuration 
control. This score may be upgraded to a 4.0/4.0 when more detailed documentation is created. 
 
H. People Qualifications – Received a score of 4.0/4.0. Each engineer associated with software updates and 
improvements has an advanced degree and multiple years of experience. The primary software author is the 
original architect of the system. Each senior analyst that reports progress meeting requirements has an 
advanced degree and multiple years of experience. Each set of pre-flight test predictions is generated by an 
experienced analyst, many of whom have advanced degrees. 
VI. Simulations Anchored to Flight Tests 
The credibility of CPAS models has a strong foundation in flight testing. Three generations of design and test 
flights (Gen I, Gen II, and Gen III) are being conducted and flight test results and reconstructions are used to 
increase confidence in the DSS and CPAS parachute models. Testing and model validation methods form the 
foundation for the work that must be done in the qualification phase of testing. “Run for the record” simulations will 
be performed at the end of qualification testing, and these simulations will ultimately be used to verify CPAS 
performance requirements. That is to say, a final assessment of the CPAS flight performance requirements will be 
performed at the end of all engineering development and qualification testing. Therefore, it is of critical importance 
to achieve valid and representative reconstructions of flight test data. The exactness with which real-world results 
are represented by the simulations is fundamental in demonstrating a reliable analysis to decision makers. Other 
work by the authors of this paper may be reviewed to gain a thorough understanding of parachute reconstruction 
methods used on the CPAS project.11 
In order to develop and improve a model of CPAS parachutes, data from drop tests must be processed and the 
tests reconstructed in the simulations. On each test, a variety of instrumentation measures the necessary data: 
position and velocity, accelerations, riser and harness loads, atmospheric conditions, vehicle mass properties, and 
  





Figure 6. Drag Coefficient Correction: Drag Area & Dynamic Pressure Effects 
 
Figure 7. Initial Condition Correction: Dynamic 
Pressure. 
photogrammetry. To begin the reconstruction process, the flight test data are checked for validity and accuracy. 
Trajectory, winds, and atmospheric data are processed into “best estimate” files. These, along with the parachute 
loads and accelerometer data, provide the basis of the reconstruction. 
Vehicle mass properties and measurements are used to create an input file for DSS. Parameters from the latest 
modeling memo12 are used as a initial values for the inflation parameters of the test parachutes. Drag coefficients 
and reefing ratios are calculated from the flight data. All input parameters are checked by co-plotting the pre-flight 
simulation outputs with the flight data. Parameters are then changed iteratively until a best fit is found. A step-by-
step example case follows. Note that the below figures are idealized representations and not actual flight data. 
It is important to note that the tests which have been performed have not used the actual Orion vehicle shape or 
architecture. Further information on this can be found in the AIAA paper titled “Challenges of CPAS Flight 
Testing”.13 Some of the elements specific to the testing techniques, such as the extraction of the test payload from an 
aircraft, are not modeled in DSS. To account for this, adjustments must be made during the reconstruction to ensure 
the correct conditions at the deployment of each parachute. This ensures the simulation will achieve the correct 
dynamic pressure and vehicle dynamics, factors that are vital in calculating the correct parachute loads 
The first step in reconstructing the performance of any parachute in the deployment sequence is to determine the 
steady-state drag coefficient. The output of the simulation using the calculated drag coefficient must fall in line with 
the flight drag area and dynamic pressure. If it does not, the drag coefficient must be adjusted. As shown in Figure 6, 
the drag coefficient is increased to raise the drag area and lower the dynamic pressure. 
Once steady state characteristics have been 
determined, the second step is correct the initial 
conditions. Figure 7 shows the initial dynamic 
pressure of the simulation being lowered to match 
the flight test data. 
The final step is to vary the inflation 
parameters: fill constant (n) over-inflation factor 
(Ck), and opening profile exponent, expopen. 
Each parameter is varied individually to match 
either the drag area or loads as shown in Figure 8. 
In many cases, all flight data traces cannot be 
matched using the same inflation parameters. 
Engineering judgment is used to determine a “best 
fit” set of parameters, based primarily on the 
accuracy of the data that is being matched and the 
known deficiencies in the simulation being used. 
  





Figure 8. Best Fit Inflation Parameter: Drag Area & Parachute Loads. 
  
Figure 9. Parachute Performance Validation Data Flow 
This process is repeated for each stage of the parachute, and then for the rest of the test parachutes in the 
sequence. 
VII. Description of the Verification Cycle 
 To verify that the CPAS system meets CEV flight performance requirements, the parachute parameters are 
compiled and iteratively compared against parachute performance requirements and integrated Orion requirements. 
Figure 9 graphical depicts these iteration cycles. First, an initial parachute system is conceptually designed (1), 
tested (2), and then data is gathered from the tests (3). Next, the CPAS Analysis Integrated Product Team (IPT) 
publishes a quarterly modeling memo which summarizes the parachute model parameters representing the observed 
test performance and the associated uncertainties of these parameters after each set of flight test reconstructions (4). 
The data from this memo is tested in benchmark simulation cases to determine if CPAS performance requirements 
are met and overall performance is tracked (5). If the CPAS requirements are not met, either the requirements 
documents or the CPAS design is refined (5a). Once the benchmark simulation study is complete, the memo is 
transmitted to groups responsible for Orion vehicle modeling and simulation such that integrated vehicle trajectories 
and performance may be evaluated and performance requirements may be assessed (6). Then, integrated flight tests 
are conducted to certify the integrated CPAS and Orion systems are acceptable for human flight (7). These 
integrated flights tests will include unmanned  and manned tests such as Orion Flight Test 1 (OFT-1) and 
qualification tests. Lastly, a final set of simulations will be run (8) which will verify and formally document the 
vehicle for its intended operations. 
  





Flight testing of parachutes is an expensive and time consuming endeavor. It is impractical to test every flight 
condition and situation that a spacecraft recovery system is expected to encounter. Additionally, it is impossible to 
control all of the external environmental factors, or to provide exact replications of tests; therefore, it is necessary to 
verify some requirements through the use of flight simulation models. It is imperative that the decision makers 
involved are confident with the results of these simulation models. In the case of Orion parachutes, CPAS is using 
the DSS simulation to verify loads and rate of descent requirements, and an independent model to verify the torque 
requirement. DSS currently has a model credibility score of 3.125/4.0. This rating does not include the non-rated 
torque model. Efforts are underway to further quantify uncertainty and robustness of the results, which will likely 
lead to an increased score at the end of CPAS Gen III testing. In large part, the credibility of the DSS lies in the fact 
that it has been used to reconstruct numerous flight tests on several different NASA projects.  
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